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This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of
philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that, on a conceptual level,
mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy
loss. The second is that, given empirical constraints, most of what we call “conscious
thought” is better analyzed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks
crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition - such as
mental agency, explicit, consciously experienced goal-directedness, or availability for veto
control. I claim that for roughly two thirds of our conscious life-time we do not possess
mental autonomy (M-autonomy) in this sense. Empirical data from research on mind
wandering and nocturnal dreaming clearly show that phenomenally represented cognitive
processing is mostly an automatic, non-agentive process and that personal-level cognition
is an exception rather than the rule. This raises an interesting new version of the mind-body
problem: How is subpersonal cognition causally related to personal-level thought? More
fine-grained phenomenological descriptions for what we called “conscious thought” in
the past are needed, as well as a functional decomposition of umbrella terms like “mind
wandering” into different target phenomena and a better understanding of the frequent
dynamic transitions between spontaneous, task-unrelated thought and meta-awareness.
In an attempt to lay some very first conceptual foundations for the now burgeoning field of
research on mind wandering, the third section proposes two new criteria for individuating
single episodes of mind-wandering, namely, the “self-representational blink” (SRB) and a
sudden shift in the phenomenological “unit of identification” (UI). I close by specifying a list
of potentially innovative research goals that could serve to establish a stronger connection
between mind wandering research and philosophy of mind.
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INTRODUCTION: THE RELEVANCE OF MINDWANDERING
RESEARCH FOR PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
Philosophy of mind is not about mental states. It investigates
the concepts we use to refer to mental states. The philosopher’s
job is mainly to clarify, differentiate and enrich existing con-
cepts, and sometimes even to develop new conceptual tools to
support ongoing research programs. Relatedly, the philosophy of
psychology and the philosophy of cognitive science are not about
psychological states or cognitive processing per se, but about
the theories we construct about such states and processes, about
what counts as an explanation, about what the explananda really
are—and about how to integrate different data-sets into a more
general theoretical framework. Here, I will offer three simple
conceptual tools that may prove helpful: The notion of “mental
autonomy (M-autonomy),” the distinction between personal and
subpersonal states, and the concept of a “phenomenal self-model”
(PSM). At the end I will introduce two new technical terms,
the “self-representational blink” and the “unit of identification”
(Box 1).
This paper is composed of three parts. First, I will argue for
the claim that one of the most interesting ways of conceptualizing
mind wandering is by describing it as a recurring loss of auton-
omy, involving specific kinds of mental self-control. I will then
show that for the largest part of our conscious lives we are not
mentally autonomous cognitive systems. Part 2 will introduce the
distinction between subpersonal and personal events, and argue
for the claim that conscious thought should be conceived of as
a subpersonal process, with personal-level cognition being the
exception rather than the rule: roughly two thirds of conscious
human cognitive activity can actually be described as a subper-
sonal process. Here, the central point is that the transition from
subpersonal to personal-level cognition is enabled by a specific
form of conscious self-representation, namely, a global model of
the cognitive system as an epistemic agent. I argue that the phe-
nomenology of mind wandering can be described as a change in
certain functional layers of the PSM. Part 3 will take a closer look
at the phenomenology of mind wandering, extracting two novel
criteria for individuating episodes of mind wandering and lay the
conceptual foundations for future research.
Mind wandering and nocturnal dreaming (cf. Windt and
Metzinger, 2007; Fox et al., 2013; Metzinger, 2013a; Wamsley,
2013) are both interesting to philosophers, because both involve
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sudden shifts in mechanisms of self-identification, rationality
deficits, and a cyclically recurring decrease in M-autonomy that
is not self-initiated and frequently unnoticed. Generally speak-
ing, autonomy is the capacity for rational self-control, whereas
the termM-autonomy refers to the specific ability to control one’s
ownmental functions, like attention, episodic memory, planning,
concept formation, rational deliberation, or decision making, etc.
Here, my first claim is that the recurring loss of M-autonomy
is one major characteristic of our cognitive phenomenology 1
(Bayne and Montague, 2011), and that both research on dream-
ing andmind wandering have developed important research tools
to investigate this hitherto neglected aspect further (like external
probing, or systematic questions after sleep lab awakenings; see
also Smallwood, 2013; Windt, 2013).
WHAT IS AUTONOMY?
The philosophical concept of “autonomy” has been investigated
and refined since antiquity, mostly in the areas of political, legal,
and action theory (Pohlmann, 1971; Buss, 2008; Christman,
2008). As it is impossible to even remotely do justice either to
the historical literature or to current technical debates, I will, for
the purposes of this contribution, first extract four defining crite-
ria from traditional discussions to constitute a semantic precursor
for a working concept of “autonomy.” Then, I will narrow down
the resulting proto-concept to the domain of mental processes in
order to ensure its compatibility with the specific phenomenon of
mind wandering. By introducing the notion of “veto autonomy,”
or the capacity for intentional inhibition, I suggest a new working
concept of M-autonomy which, if successful, can be empirically
grounded, gradually refined, and may prove heuristically fruitful
in guiding future research.
Autonomy is rational self-control. A standard, traditional
account of human autonomy would say that autonomy is the abil-
ity to control one’s own behavior in accordance with reasons and
rational arguments. Second, autonomy is independence in the for-
mation of one’s own will, in the sense of at least potentially having
a sufficient degree of independence from one’s inner environment
(e.g., biases, needs, demands, or past conditioning). It is also the
capacity to establish and sustain individual goal-commitments
and to impose rules onto one’s own behavior as opposed to that
of others. The idea of “self-governance” captures this semantic
element on the social level; according to its historical roots in
the political philosophy of Greek antiquity, “autonomy” can also
mean opposition to and independence from an outer environ-
ment, a tyrant, or the goals, moral commitments, and already
existing laws of tradition or one’s social group. The third seman-
tic element for autonomy is self-determination. This means being
able to causally determine your own actions and the decisions that
1“Cognitive phenomenology” is a new subfield of research in philosophy of
mind that focusses on the phenomenal character of occurrent non-sensory
mental states like thoughts or wishes, and on the distinct subjective quality
that goes along with thinking (see Bayne and Montague, 2011 for a good
overview). Some philosophers claim that there is a proprietary, distinctive,
and individuative phenomenology of higher cognitive processing that cannot
be derived from sensory phenomenology, others deny this claim. For present
purposes, I leave this controversial issue to the side. My goal is more basic:
namely to develop a taxonomy for describing conscious thinking.
lead to them. The last semantic building block I want to select is
self-formation: Here, the idea is that you only gradually become a
person, a coherent self or rational subject, or even a self-governing
agent in the true sense of the word—namely, by becoming more
autonomous. Becoming autonomous in this sense is an ongoing
process, and it can also be a normative ideal. In sum, rational
self-control, a sufficient degree of independence to causally enable
individual goal-commitment, “self-governance” and rule-setting,
and causal self-determination are all properties that can (and
should) be gradually achieved by a human being. They come in
degrees, they can always be lost, and they are aspects of a process
by which we become persons, that is, rational individuals with a
coherent, conscious self-representation.
MENTAL AUTONOMY
There are not only bodily actions, but also mental actions.
Deliberately focusing one’s attention on a perceptual object or
consciously drawing a logical conclusion are examples of mental
actions. Just like physical actions, mental actions possess satisfac-
tion conditions (i.e., they are directed at a goal state). Although
they mostly lack overt behavioral correlates, they can be inten-
tionally inhibited, suspended, or terminated, just like bodily
actions can. In addition, they are interestingly characterized by
their temporally extended phenomenology of ownership, goal-
directedness, a subjective sense of effort, and the concomitant
conscious experience of global self-control and agency.
Let me distinguish the two most important types of mental
action:
• Attentional agency (AA), the ability to control one’s focus of
attention.
• Cognitive agency (CA), the ability to control goal/task-related,
deliberate thought.
AA and CA are not only functional properties that are gradu-
ally acquired in childhood, can be lost in old age or due to brain
lesions, and whose incidence, variance, robustness, etc. can be
scientifically investigated. They also have a subjective side: AA
(Metzinger, 2003a; 6.4.3, 2006, section 4) is also a phenomenal
property, as is the case for pain or the subjective quality of “blue-
ness” in a visual color experience (Metzinger, 1995). AA is the
conscious experience of actually initiating a shift of attention,
of controlling and fixing its focus on a certain aspect of reality.
AA involves a sense of effort, and it is the phenomenal signa-
ture of our functional ability to actively influence what we will
come to know, and what, for now, we will ignore2. Consciously
2This means that AA is one specific example of having a consciously experi-
enced first-person perspective (1PP). Its theoretical relevance consists in the
fact that it is plausibly the simplest form of an EAM human beings can have.
For philosophers, the concept of a 1PP is highly relevant, and for a wide
range of reasons. For example, one classical philosophical issue is the ques-
tion of what exactly it means that conscious mental states are “subjective”
states. What exactly does it mean that conscious experience is often bound
to an individual 1PP? We lack an empirically grounded theory of subjectivity,
a model of the 1PP as a naturally evolved phenomenon. Having a 1PP is not
a unitary, but a graded phenomenon, and research on mind wandering can
make decisive contributions by functionally dissociating different levels.
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experienced AA is theoretically important, because it is probably
the earliest and simplest form of experiencing oneself a know-
ing self, as an epistemic agent. To consciously enjoy AA means
that you (the cognitive system as a whole) currently identify
with the content of a particular self-representation, an “epistemic
agent model” (EAM; Metzinger, 2013a) currently active in your
brain. AA is fully transparent 3: The content of your conscious
experience is not one of self-representation or of an ongoing pro-
cess of self-modeling, of depicting yourself as a causal agent in
certain shifts of “zoom factor,” “resolving power,” or “resource
allocation,” and so on. Rather, you directly experience yourself
as, for example, actively selecting a new object for attention.
During mind wandering episodes we do not have AA, although
these episodes can of course be about having been an attentional
agent in the past, or about planning to control one’s attention in
the future. Other examples of situations in which this property
is selectively missing are non-lucid dreaming and NREM-sleep
mentation (Metzinger, 2013a; Windt, 2014), but also infancy,
dementia, or severe intoxication syndromes.
An analog point can be made for CA. Conceptually, it is not
only a complex set of functional abilities, like the capacity of men-
tal calculation, consciously drawing logical conclusions, engaging
in rational, symbolic thought, and so on. There is a distinct phe-
nomenology of currently being a cognitive agent (CA), which
can lead to experiential self-reports like “I am a thinking self in
the act of grasping a concept,” “I have just actively arrived at a
specific conclusion,” etc. What AA and CA have in common is
that in both cases, we consciously represent ourselves as epistemic
agents. Therefore, the concept of an EAM, refers to a specific type
of conscious self-representation. This simply means that on the
level of conscious experience, the self is represented as something
that either currently stands in an epistemic relation to the world,
in the relation of knowing, thinking, actively guiding attention,
or actively trying to understand what is going on its environ-
ment, or, more abstractly, as an entity that has the ability to do
so4. During full-blown episodes of mind wandering, we are not
3“Transparency” is a property of conscious representations, namely, that they
are not experienced as representations. Therefore, the subject of experience
has the feeling of being in direct and immediate contact with their content.
Transparent conscious representations create the phenomenology of naïve
realism. An opaque phenomenal representation is one that is experienced
as a representation, for example in pseudo-hallucinations or lucid dreams.
A transparent self-model creates the phenomenology of identification (sec-
tion Mind Wandering as a Switch in the Unit of Identification). There exists a
graded spectrum between transparency and opacity, determining the variable
phenomenology of “mind-independence” or “realness.” Unconscious repre-
sentations are neither transparent nor opaque. See Metzinger (2003b) for a
concise introduction.
4This is not say that we never purposefully engage in daydreams or that there
are never situations in which we are mind wandering while being passively
aware of this fact. This is only to say that intentional episodes of daydreaming,
to the extent that they do involve the phenomenology of AA and CA, thereby
do not count as episodes ofmindwandering, which refer only to unintentional
episodes of stimulus-independent thought. One advantage of the terminolog-
ical solution proposed here is exactly that it enables a continuous description
of real-word cases: As long as the EAM still represents the ability to become an
active attentional or cognitive agent, we have M-autonomy. What has been
termed “zoning out” (unaware mind wandering) and “tuning out” (mind
epistemic agents, neither as controllers of attentional focus nor
as deliberate thinkers of thoughts, and we have forgotten about
our agentive abilities. A first interim conclusion then is that at the
onset of a mind wandering episode, the EAM collapses (see sec-
tions The Self-Representational Blink and Mind Wandering as a
Switch in the Unit of Identification).
LOSING MENTAL AUTONOMY
Some mental activities are not controllable, because the third
defining characteristic does not hold: They cannot be inhibited,
suspended, or terminated. Let us call these activities “uninten-
tional mental behaviors.” Mind wandering can now be concep-
tualized as a form of unintentional behavior, as an involuntary
form of mental activity. Of course, the fact that a behavior, be
it mental or bodily, is unintentional in no way implies that this
behavior is unintelligent or even maladaptive. For example, low-
level, saliency driven shifts in attentional focus are unintentional
mental behaviors, and not inner actions. In standard situations,
they cannot be inhibited. They are initiated by unconsciousmech-
anisms, but may well result in an EAM as their final stage on the
symbolic level. Stimulus-independent, task-independent thought
is often a form of uncontrolled mental behavior, a breakdown
of consciously guided epistemic autoregulation. As long as it is
going on, we lack the ability to terminate or suspend it (I will
present a reason for this fact in section Making Progress on the
Phenomenology of Mind-Wandering below). Yet, from an evo-
lutionary perspective, it may well count as a newly developed,
adaptive, and intelligent form of virtual behaviour.
We can now also define a notion of “2nd-order mental
action.” The satisfaction conditions of 2nd-order mental actions
are constituted by successfully influencing other mental actions
or mental behaviors. What Schooler and colleagues have pro-
visionally termed “meta-awareness” (Schooler et al., 2011) is a
necessary precondition for 2nd-order mental action. Examples
for 2nd-order mental action are the termination of an ongoing
violent fantasy, but also the deliberate strengthening and sustain-
ing of a spontaneously arising daydream, the effortful attempt
to make an ongoing process of visual perception more precise
by selectively controlling the focus of attention, or—in mental
calculation or logical thought—the process of imposing a very
specific abstract structure on a temporal sequence of inner events,
of “conducting” a symbolic train of thought (McVay and Kane,
2009). Philosophically, it is interesting to note how 2nd-order
mental actions are essential tools for achieving higher degrees
of M-autonomy and self-determination; and also how many of
them can be described as processes of computational resource
allocation in the brain. The potential for M-autonomy and the
functional ability to (at least sometimes) operate under a con-
scious EAM are excellent candidates for criteria of personhood,
which have the advantage of empirical grounding and hardware-
independence at the same time. It is also important to note that
the conceptual distinction between AA and CA either as func-
tional or as phenomenal properties allows for the possibility
wandering with awareness) in the empirical literature (Smallwood et al., 2007
p. 524, 2008; Schooler et al., 2011, p. 323) can be nicely captured by this
conceptual distinction.
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of hallucinating epistemic agency. We might experience our-
selves as autonomous mental subjects, but in some cases this
might be an adaptive form of self-deception or confabulation
(von Hippel and Trivers, 2011). For example, if a subject during
an experimental design involvingmindfulness-based stress reduc-
tion regains meta-awareness (Hölzel et al., 2011; Mrazek et al.,
2012) and describes the experience as “I have just realized that
I was daydreaming and redirected my attention to the current
moment and the physical sensations caused by the process of
breathing,” it may be false to assume that, functionally, the “real-
ization” was actually a form of AA or CA (see Schooler et al.,
2011, and section The re-appearance of meta-awareness). What
is subjectively described or experienced as 2nd-order mental
action may sometimes not be a personal-level event at all, but
a shift in the subpersonal self-model that is then misdescribed
on the level of self-report. In some cases, it may simply be an
autophenomenological post-hoc-confabulation.
“Veto autonomy” (V-autonomy) is the capacity to voluntar-
ily suspend or inhibit an action, and from a logical point of view
it is a functional property which we do not ascribe to the brain,
but to the person as a whole. Let us call the capacity in question
“intentional inhibition”5. During a mind wandering episode, we
do not have this capacity, because we cannot actively suspend or
inhibit our ownmental behavior without thereby terminating the
mind wandering episode itself (or by turning it into something
else, such as a controlled fantasy, as indicated above, cf. foot-
note 4). Recent empirical work reveals the dorsal fronto-median
cortex (dFMC) as a candidate region for the physical realiza-
tion of this very special form of purely mental 2nd-order action6
. It does not overlap with known networks for external inhibi-
tion, and its computational function may lie in predicting the
social and more long-term individual consequences of a currently
unfolding action, that is, in representing the action’s socially and
temporally more distant implications for the organism 7. There
is a considerable amount of valuable neurobiological data on the
physical substrates of intentional inhibition in human beings, and
a number of them have already led to more abstract computa-
tional models of volitional control, action selection, and intention
inhibition itself Brass and Haggard, 2007; Campbell-Meiklejohn
et al., 2008; Kühn et al., 2009; Filevich et al., 2012, 2013. These
data are valuable not only for understanding the “back end” of
many mind wandering episodes (section The re-appearance of
meta-awareness), but also for a more comprehensive theory of
M-autonomy.
Conceptually, many forms of mental self-control—like AA—
presuppose V-autonomy, but are not directly guided by
consciously represented reasons, explicit logical inferences, or
arguments. Indeed, there is no need or even conceptual necessity
5In adopting this terminological convention, I follow Marcel Brass [Brass
and Haggard (2007)]; an excellent and helpful recent review is Filevich et al.
(2012).
6See Brass and Haggard (2007); Campbell-Meiklejohn et al. (2008); Kühn
et al. (2009). A helpful recent review of negative motor effects following direct
cortical stimulation, listing the main sites of arrest responses and offering
interesting discussion is Filevich et al. (2012)
7This passage draws on Metzinger (2013a). See also Filevich et al. (2012,
2013).
to specify autonomy as rational self-control, because our capac-
ity for rational self-control is only a special case of a more
comprehensive, fundamental set of functional properties. First,
rationality does not have to express itself in terms of explicit,
symbolic reasoning processes using propositional data-formats
(e.g., a Fodorian “language of thought”), but can be operationally
defined as a property of some global input-output-function max-
imizing a specific fitness criterion. Second, there are more opera-
tional and empirically grounded models of autonomy, combining
the notion of causal self-determination with independence from
alternative causes, both inner and outer (see Seth, 2010 for the
notion of “G-autonomy” based on a formal analysis of Granger
causality). For empirical research programs on mind wander-
ing, such operational concepts are more likely to yield specific,
testable hypotheses. Nevertheless, the notion of “rational mental
self-control” in the traditional sense remains important if we want
to understand the phenomenology of high-level cognition and the
normative components of our concept of “personhood.” Explicit
rational self-control on the mental level cannot be reduced to
veto control—on the contrary, the capacity for veto autonomy
is one of its centrally relevant constitutive conditions. Clearly,
the capacity for inhibiting mental processes via 2nd-order acts
of vetoing without the involvement of quasi-conceptual or quasi-
propositional representations is the more frequent and also more
basic phenomenon, and hence also the more fundamental target
for research. You can only be rational if you have the capacity
for mental veto autonomy, but you can achieve a high degree of
M-autonomy without rational self-control.
M-AUTONOMY
We can now define a working concept of M-autonomy as the
ability to control the conscious contents of one’s mind in a goal-
directed way, by means of attentional or CA. This ability can be
a form of rational self-control, which is based on reasons, beliefs,
and conceptual thought, but it does not have to be.What is crucial
is the “veto component”: Being mentally autonomous means that
all currently ongoing processes can in principle be suspended or
terminated. This does not mean that they actually are terminated,
it just means that the ability, the functional potential, is given and
that the person has knowledge of this fact. M-autonomy is the
capacity for causal self-determination on the mental level. It has a
specific phenomenological profile (see section The Re-appearance
of Meta-Awareness), and it certainly comes in degrees, but it is a
rather rare property possessed by human beings for only about
one third of their conscious life-time. M-autonomy is absent
during episodes of mind wandering.
Two points are important in order to avoid potential misun-
derstandings. First, process and content must not be confused:
Mind wandering episodes can certainly be about M-autonomy,
they can represent past events in which we actually had
M-autonomy, or involve the planning of future actions which
presuppose M-autonomy, and so on. But because the onset of
such episodes will be beyond conscious control, the episode
itself is a subpersonal process (see section The Distinction
between Subpersonal and Personal Processes). Second, there
are interesting situations where human beings quickly alternate
between mind wandering and short episodes of M-autonomy.
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For example, a student may have dissociated from a boring lec-
ture into a pleasant fantasy in which he now indulges. However,
from time to time he may “nudge” the fantasy in a certain direc-
tion, trying to optimize the daydream, only to deliberately let go
again and enjoy the currently pleasant loss of autonomy. The fan-
tasy as a whole, then, is neither an episode of mind-wandering
nor a controlled chain of mental actions, but a complex, hybrid
process. One may speculate that such hybrid and functionally
graded situations are rather frequent (Schad et al., 2012), as in
ecologically valid situations, we often seem to move in and out
M-autonomy. There is an important conceptual issue here: If
we individuate mental episodes by their introspectively accessed
content (a specific emotional content or memory element in
depressive rumination, a single future task, or an expected situ-
ation in autobiographical planning, etc.), then extended chains
of mind wandering interspersed with brief, lucid moments of
M-autonomy will appear as a single and unified explanandum.
A fine-grained functional analysis, however, will likely reveal a
large number of individual state transitions (see section The Self-
Representational Blink), perhaps also a continuous cyclical path
through a state-space the dimensions of which empirical research
on mind wandering is just beginning to explore. M-autonomy
may certainly be a normative ideal from a wider philosophical
perspective, but empirical facts clearly show that we only rarely
pass through those regions of our mental state-space to which the
concept points8.
What about the fourth defining element, the notion of self-
formation? Regaining M-autonomy—a functional transition that
in healthy people probably takes place many hundred times every
day—is also self-constitution, because a new type of conscious
self-model is created, an EAM, which may change global prop-
erties of the system as a whole (e.g., turning it into a subject
of experience or being recognized as a rational individual by
other cognitive systems). You become more coherent and you
construct your own, subjectively experienced transtemporal iden-
tity by successfully exerting mental self-control. You do this
by constructing an autobiographical self-model from memories
8Note, however, that there may also be methodological limits to how fine-
grained such a distinction can be: in laboratory research on lucid dreams,
dreams are typically scored as lucid if the dreamer submits predetermined eye
movement signals while dreaming and later confirms having done so through-
out awakening. At the same time, it is well known that lucidity fluctuates,
and indeed it is often described as a balancing act between returning to a
non-lucid dream and waking up (cf. Windt and Metzinger, 2007). Asking
subjects to signal at certain time-intervals may be a way to ensure that lucid-
ity and dream control were preserved throughout the dreams [cf. Stumbrys
et al. (2013)]; however, even this method cannot rule out the occurrence of
lapses of lucidity during the intervals, and asking subjects to signal lucidity
continuously throughout the episode would surely be too demanding and dis-
ruptive. A related problem is that while the type of veto-autonomy required
for M-autonomy is an ability, it can only be operationalized by investigat-
ing its realization, namely actual acts of terminating an ongoing episode of
mind wandering. This, again, would seem to place certain methodological
limits on how fine-grained the criteria for individuating such episodes can
be. The challenge, then, is to develop a conceptual framework that is fine-
grained enough to capture moment-to-moment fluctuations, but at the same
time clear enough to be operationalized and allow for the formulation of clear
scoring criteria.
of having had M-autonomy, of having successfully controlled,
and thereby appropriated, ongoing cognitive activity in the past,
successfully making it, phenomenologically, your own activity
(Metzinger, 2003a, 2007; see section Making Progress on the
Phenomenology of Mind-Wandering below). Put simply, under
standard conditions what you own is what you can in principle
causally control, and this principle holds on the level of mental
self-representation as well. Of course, the phenomenal experience
of ownership can be manipulated merely by passive exposure to
correlations among self-related signals, as in the rubber hand illu-
sion or experimentally induced full-body illusions (Lenggenhager
et al., 2007). But agency is more than ownership, it is related to
the experience of successful control, and it is also exactly what is
relevant in describing the relationship between mind wandering
and M-autonomy in terms of the existence or non-existence of an
EAM. You can own the thoughts generated by a wandering mind
without an EAM (phenomenologically they are still yours) even
if the knowledge that you have the causal capacity for self-control
is not consciously available, not represented on the level of your
PSM. Importantly, this also suggests that rationalizing an earlier
episode as having been under one’s control may be a functionally
necessary way of re-establishing and preserving internal coher-
ence of the conscious self-model, even if this process involves a
retrospective confabulation.
One speculative empirical prediction following from these
abstract considerations is that one function of mind wandering
may be “autobiographical self-model maintenance,” the stabi-
lizing of a functional platform that, first, causally enables the
episodic activation of an EAM and, second, creates an adaptive
form of self-deception, namely, an illusion of personal identity
across time. That is, mind wandering is not only involved in auto-
matic autobiographical planning (Baird et al., 2011; Mooneyham
and Schooler, 2013; Stawarczyk et al., 2013) and the restructur-
ing of a person’s goal hierarchy (Klinger, 2013) per se, but also
in the constant creation and functional maintenance of the rep-
resentation of transtemporal continuity, a fictional “self” that
then lays the foundation for important achievements like reward
prediction, delay discounting, etc. (Redshaw and Suddendorf,
2013; Smallwood et al., 2013). Here, my conceptual point is
that only if an organism simulates itself as being one and the
same across time will it be able to represent reward events or
the achievement of goals as happening to the same entity, as a
fulfillment of its own goals 9. Call this the “Principle of Virtual
Identity Formation:”Many higher forms of intelligence and adap-
tive behavior, including risk management, moral cognition, and
cooperative social behavior, functionally presuppose a self-model
that portrays the organism as a single entity that endures over
time. Because we are really only cognitive systems with a cer-
tain degree of physical and psychological continuity, but with-
out any precise identity criteria, identity formation can only be
achieved on a virtual level, for example through the creation of
an automatic narrative. This could be the more fundamental and
9Schizophrenic delusions of thought control and thought insertion may be
cases in which this ability breaks down and in which the respective thoughts
cannot, as it were, be smoothly integrated into the self-model; see Metzinger
(2003a, 2004); Stephens and Graham (2000) for discussion.
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overarching computational goal of mind wandering, and one it
may share with dreaming (Pace-Schott, 2013). Therefore, apart
from the many specific adaptive functions it may have (Mason
et al., 2013; Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013; Smallwood and
Andrews-Hanna, 2013), mind wandering would then be a sort of
baseline activity serving to maintain a minimal level of arousal
and functional continuity, the default mode of autobiographi-
cal self-modeling, a permanent mechanism of re-encoding and
synaptic stabilization, constructing a domain-general functional
platform enabling long-term motivation and future planning. It
is not M-autonomy itself that has this function. On the contrary,
some types of mind wandering may actually be causally enabling
factors in constituting the kind of conscious self-model an organ-
ism needs in order to episodically realize the functional property
of M-autonomy plus the illusion of transtemporal identity (see
section The Re-appearance of Meta-Awareness).
INTERIM CONCLUSION 1: MENTAL AUTONOMY AS AN EXCEPTION
In conclusion, mind wandering can be understood as a loss of
M-autonomy, because it involves an unnoticed loss of mental
self-control and epistemic agency, either on the level of attention
or of cognition. As an unintentional form of mental behavior it
is not rationally guided, and while it is unfolding it cannot be
terminated at will. Mind wandering is a failure of causal self-
determination on the level of mental content, and although it
clearly has aspects that can be described as functionally adaptive,
its overall performance costs and its negative effects on general,
subjective well-being are obvious and have been well documented
(for example, in terms of reading comprehension, memory, sus-
tained attention, or working memory, cf. Mrazek et al., 2013;
Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013; Table 1). It is an important con-
tribution of research on mind wandering to have demonstrated
the ubiquity of the phenomenon and its effects.
We know that conscious mind wandering is a process that
can get completely out of control (Schupak and Rosenthal, 2009;
Bigelsen and Schupak, 2011), but that can also come completely
to rest, either in practitioners of mindfulness meditation (Slagter
et al., 2011; Mrazek et al., 2012) or following lesions to the medial
frontal cortex (Damasio and van Hoesen, 1983). Under normal
conditions, we spend 30–50% or our conscious waking lives mind
wandering (Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010;
Schooler et al., 2011). During these times we do not possess M-
autonomy. If we assume a 16-h day period, 40% of waking mind
wandering would amount to an average of 384min, a period dur-
ing which we are not autonomous mental subjects. NREM-sleep
mentation and non-lucid dreaming clearly are also periods during
which the functional property ofM-autonomy is absent, although
complex cognitive processes are taking place across all sleep stages
(Nielsen, 2000; Fosse et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2013; Wamsley, 2013;
Windt, 2014) and can be sampled, for example using a serial
awakening paradigm (Noreika et al., 2009; Siclari et al., 2013).
Although great progress has recently been made in isolating the
neural correlates of dream lucidity (Voss et al., 2009; Dresler et al.,
2012) and developing a more fine-grained conceptual taxonomy
for different kinds of lucidity (Noreika et al., 2010; Voss et al.,
2013; Windt, 2014) it remains clear that M-autonomy during the
dream state is a very rare phenomenon.
There are certainly phenomenological differences in reports
following awakenings from REM sleep, which often result in
elaborate narratives including complex multimodal imagery and
intense emotions, and often less vivid and more thought-like
reports from NREM sleep (Hobson et al., 2000; 799–803;
Wamsley and Antrobus, 2009; for a comprehensive discussion see
Windt, 2014, chapter 2); and there is clearly complex cognitive
phenomenology during sleep as well (which also includes voli-
tional components, Dresler et al., 2013); but as the frequency
of lucidity (Metzinger, 2003a; Noreika et al., 2010; Voss et al.,
2013) is generally so low as to be negligible for the present dis-
cussion, conscious thought during sleep can be treated as lacking
M-autonomy almost entirely. Adults spend approximately 1.5–
2 h per night in REM sleep (Hobson, 2002, pp. 77–79f). NREM
sleep yields similar reports during stage 1, other stages of NREM
sleep are characterized by more purely cognitive/symbolic men-
tation. Clearly, conscious thought during NREM-sleep also lacks
M-autonomy, because it is mostly confused, non-progressive, and
perseverative. Whereas 81.9% of awakenings from REM sleep
yieldmentation reports, the incidence of reports followingNREM
awakenings lies at only 43% (Nielsen, 2000, p. 855). If we assume
an average REM-time of 105-min, there will be an average of
86min characterized by phenomenally represented, but subper-
sonal cognitive processing; 375min of NREM sleep will yield
roughly 161min of conscious mentation without M-autonomy.
Assuming a waking period of 960min, a very rough, first-order
approximation is that human beings enjoy one sort of phe-
nomenology or another for about 20 h a day (1207min; or about
84% of their daytime), but healthy adults are onlyM-autonomous
for 9.6 h (576min; or 40% of an average day). These are very
conservative estimates. For example, they also exclude life-time
periods of illness, intoxication, or anaesthesia. In addition, there
is evidence for extended periods in which human beings lose
M-autonomy altogether. These episodesmay often not be remem-
bered and also frequently escape detection by external observers,
as in “mind blanking” (Ward and Wegner, 2013). The same may
also be true of periods of insomnia, in which people are plagued
by intrusive thoughts, feelings of regret, shame, and guilt while
suffering from dysfunctional forms of cognitive control, such
as thought suppression, worry, rumination, and counterfactual
imagery (Schmidt and van der Linden, 2009; Gay et al., 2011;
Schmidt et al., 2011). We do not know when and how chil-
dren actually acquire the necessary changes in their conscious
self-model (Redshaw and Suddendorf, 2013), but we may cer-
tainly add the empirically plausible assumption that children only
gradually acquire M-autonomy and that most of us likely lose it
toward the ends of our lives.
The first conclusion to be drawn from this is that, accord-
ing to our preliminary working concept of M-autonomy, human
beings, although phenomenally conscious, are not autonomous
mental subjects for roughly two thirds of their lifetime. A second,
related conclusion is that conscious thought primarily and pre-
dominantly is an automatic subpersonal process, like heartbeat
or immune autoregulation—and that on the conceptual level, we
should do justice to this fact. It is empirically plausible to assume
that a considerable part of our own cognitive phenomenology
simply results from a frequent failure of executive control (McVay
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and Kane, 2009, 2010). I would claim that this actually is one of
the most important functional and phenomenological character-
istics of human self-consciousness, as a matter of fact, one of its
most general, principal features: The almost constant presence of
subpersonal and automatically generatedmental activity as gener-
ated by certain parts of the default-mode network; (Raichle et al.,
2001; Buckner et al., 2008; Mantini and Vanduffel, 2012), in com-
bination with a frequent inability of the executive-control system
to shield primary-task performance off against interference from
these subpersonal thought processes (Smallwood et al., 2012). If I
am right, autonomous cognitive self-control is an exception, not
the rule.
Consequently, we will also have to depart from the “Myth
of Cognitive Agency,” which says that the paradigmatic case
of conscious cognition is one of autonomous, self-controlled
rational thought. Hard-thinking philosophers, in particular, have
perpetuated this myth like a phenomenologically self-fulfilling
prophecy. Of course, it is always possible that their introspec-
tive experience really does differ, however, slightly, from that
of the general population. But it is also possible that in think-
ing about these issues, they have mistaken exceptional cases of
directed, effortful thinking of the type required for philosophi-
cal theorizing for paradigm cases of conscious mental activity. As
M-autonomy has been intimately related to the professional self-
understanding of philosophers for centuries there was a strong
incentive, and clearly, we do, as an academic group, pride our-
selves in being particularly good at it. But even if some of us
may occasionally succeed in realizing these rationalist ideals, we
probably only do so intermittently, and it is a merit of empiri-
cal research on mind wandering to finally make it clear that this
type of controlled, effortful thinking may actually be a very bad
model of conscious thought in general. The interesting question
now becomes what it is that, sometimes,makes a subpersonal pro-
cess into something that permits the ascription of personal-level
psychological predicates.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUBPERSONAL AND
PERSONAL PROCESSES
THE CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTION
There are many levels of description on which we can gain knowl-
edge about a human being. We can discover psychological truths
about a given individual, but also biological (Millikan, 1984),
or neurocomputational truths (Churchland, 1989; Clark, 1989;
Hohwy, 2013), as well as physical truths about its bodily consti-
tution. Which level we choose depends on our epistemic interests
(what exactly it is that we want to know) and on a set of abstract
methodological principles (for example, parsimony, coherence
with existing theories, predictive power, heuristic fecundity).
Often, there are types of explanation corresponding to such levels
of description, and sometimes they stand in conflict.
Philosophers of mind have long distinguished personal
and subpersonal-level explanations (Dennett, 1969, p. 93pp.;
Davidson, 1980; Dennett, 1987). There have been extended
technical discussions about whether one can speak of per-
sonal/subpersonal events, processes, states or facts in the same
manner (Drayson, 2012), but also about the constitutive relevance
of facts about subpersonal states for personal-level phenomena
(McDowell, 1994; Hornsby, 2000; Colombo, 2012). Personal-level
explanations are horizontal: they proceed from the past to the
future in explaining single events by representing a diachronic
causal relation as a horizontal line (Kim, 2005, p. 36). Subpersonal
explanations are typically vertical: they concern the relationship
between micro- and macro-levels, for example by explaining the
abilities or dispositions an organism has in terms of its parts
and their causal relations, or by giving a functional analysis that
becomes more and more fine-grained. A well-known mistake is
the ascription of psychological predicates to parts of a person’s
brain (e.g., “The prefrontal cortex plans actions”; “The premotor
cortex decides on the initiation and organization of own move-
ment sequences”). The conceptual mistake of ascribing a property
that can only be ascribed to the whole entity to a part of it
(called the “mereological fallacy”; see Bennett and Hacker, 2003,
p. 72) often, but not necessarily accompanies the explanatory
error of ascribing mental properties to subpersonal explananda
(the “homunculus fallacy”; for a lucid discussion, see Drayson,
2012, section Is Conscious thought a Personal-Level Process?).
Interestingly, the concept of wandering has personal and sub-
personal uses at the same time, even groups of persons or physical
objects engage in it. Philosophers engage in peripatetic wander-
ing, some of them become wandering monks or even wander
from the path of righteousness by becoming wandering preachers,
nomadic tribes wander, etc.—but so do bullets, kidneys, testicles,
the poles or the Earth’s magnetic field. In current publications
about mind-wandering, the use of the term “mind” subtly oscil-
lates between personal and subpersonal uses as well. “Mind” is a
folk-psychological term, but it is often used as if referring to a uni-
tary entity that “does” the wandering (e.g., “. . . lapses in “control”
allow the mind to escape from what it is doing,” cf. Smallwood
et al., 2012, p. 67, Box 3). Therefore, an important future step
will be to clearly acknowledge the fact that mind wandering is a
target for genuinely vertical, subpersonal psychological explana-
tion, and to dissolve the vague, folk-psychological umbrella term
“mind” into a well-ordered set of successor concepts.
IS CONSCIOUS THOUGHT A PERSONAL-LEVEL PROCESS?
In some of its aspects, gaining meta-awareness of ongoing mind-
wandering is like gaining meta-awareness of your breath or your
heartbeat. Heartbeat, breathing, and seemingly task-unrelated,
phenomenologically spontaneous thoughts are not personal-level
psychological processes that are mysteriously correlated with or
caused by some physical chain of events. The most parsimo-
nious metaphysical interpretation of the relevant scientific data
is that they are identical with functionally complex, but sub-
global physiological processes in the biological body. In the case of
momentary lapses of attention and mind-wandering, this physi-
ological process is a specific, widely distributed pattern of neural
activity, and it is now empirically plausible to assume that large
parts of this pattern overlap with activity in the default mode net-
work [DMN; (Weissman et al., 2006; Buckner and Carroll, 2007;
Mason et al., 2007; Buckner et al., 2008; Christoff et al., 2009;
Spreng et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Stawarczyk et al.,
2011; Christoff, 2012; Mantini and Vanduffel, 2012; Gruberger
et al., 2011)]. Any rational research heuristics for heartbeat,
breathing, or the critical subset of DMN activity will therefore
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treat them as subpersonal, bodily processes. All three of them
have a long evolutionary history (Lu et al., 2012; Mantini and
Vanduffel, 2012; Corballis, 2013), and all three of them are clearly
dynamic, self-organizing chains of events that continuously and
automatically unfold over time, and not agentive processes imply-
ing explicit goal-selection, rationality constraints, etc. If one
adds the straightforward metaphysical assumption of a domain-
specific identity (McCauley and Bechtel, 2001; Bickle, 2013)
holding between the phenomenal states constituting episodes of
mind wandering and what we are currently beginning to discover
as their local, minimally sufficient neural correlates (Chalmers,
2000), then it becomes clear that mind wandering simply is the
phenomenal awareness of a local bodily process10.
A SKETCH OF A MODEL TO SOLVE THE INTERFACE PROBLEM
But why do we subjectively experience some of our cognitive
processes as personal-level properties from the first-person per-
spective? There is a long story to be told here (Metzinger, 2003a,
2006, 2007, 2008), but the short answer is this: Because they have
been embedded into an EAM, which is currently active in our
brain; and because we live in a normative sociocultural context in
which we folk-psychologically describe and reciprocally acknowl-
edge each other as rational individuals, which in turn influences
introspective experience itself. I will not go into any of the
theoretical complications here, but will briefly sketch an oversim-
plified model of the transition from subpersonal to personal-level
states. The philosophical problem in the background is the ques-
tion of how precisely common-sense psychological explanation
interfaces with the explanations given by scientific psychology
and cognitive neuroscience (Bermúdez, 2005, section Interim
Conclusion 2: Conscious thought as a Subpersonal Process).
My point is that the conscious brain—which had to predict
the organism’s complex internal dynamics (Seth et al., 2012) as
well as its external behavior on a global, whole-organism scale
(Metzinger, 2014)—solved this problem long before psycholo-
gists and philosophers even conceived of it in the first place. What
it needed was a flexible instrument allowing the system to appro-
priate some of its subpersonal processes on the representational
level, as well as on the level of causal self-control. We have to
understand the connection between subpersonal and personal-
level phenomenology in order to understand the intuitions that
10Functionally, breathing and heartbeat are obviously quite different with
respect to the availability for voluntary control. Breathing can be delib-
erately manipulated (even terminated at will), though not indefinitely.
Phenomenologically, spontaneous thought is different from heartbeat and
breathing. Mind wandering episodes can be terminated as soon as we
have “come to ourselves” in the sense of having regained M-autonomy,
though, again functionally speaking, not indefinitely. As opposed to breath-
ing, the phenomenology of heartbeat is also much more subtle, and harder
to influence deliberately. Moreover, breath and heartbeat share the func-
tional property of being available through an interoceptive receptor system.
Therefore, they generate a sensory phenomenology of self-representation.
By contrast, as the human brain is devoid of any self-directed sensory
channels or receptor systems, the relevant subset of DMN-activity can-
not be informationally accessed through any perception-like causal links.
Consequntly, the phenomenology of cognition must necessarily be a non-
sensory phenomenology—although it can of course be about possible sensory
perceptions, motor simulations, fantasy worlds, etc.
create the methodological and philosophical issues constituting
the interface problem.
The decisive component is a specific kind of conscious self-
representation, a PSM (see section Making Progress on the
Phenomenology of Mind-Wandering below) that portrays the
system as an epistemic agent, as an entity that is actively search-
ing for and optimizing its knowledge, for example by controlling
its own high-level, quasi-symbolic processing as a CA or by
actively sustaining and controlling the focus of attention (AA).
This is what I call an EAM 11. It can be shown that human
beings can enjoy a minimal form of self-consciousness without
possessing an EAM (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Limanowski
and Blankenburg, 2013). The transition from simple, bodily self-
identification to this much stronger form takes place when a
system phenomenally represents itself as an entity capable of epis-
temic agency, or even as one currently exerting epistemic agency.
If such a specific kind of self-model is in place, ongoing processes
can be embedded into it, thereby creating the phenomenology of
ownership (my thought, my own autobiographical memory, my
own future planning). If these processes are represented as con-
trol processes, as successful acts of exerting causal influence, they
can now be consciously experienced a processes of self -control
or successful mental self -determination. Yet, an epistemic-agent
model of this kind is not a little man in the head, but itself an
entirely subpersonal process. Human beings only become persons
by having the potential to phenomenologically identify with the
content of such a model (see section MindWandering as a Switch
in the Unit of Identification), a step which on the sociocultural
level causally enables practices like linguistically ascribing person-
status to themselves and mutually acknowledging each other as
subjects of experience, epistemic agents, and rational individuals.
INTERIM CONCLUSION 2: CONSCIOUS THOUGHT AS A SUBPERSONAL
PROCESS
The first interim conclusion was that human beings, although
phenomenally self- conscious, do not enjoy M-autonomy for
roughly two thirds of their conscious lifetime. This yields a
simple, quantitative argument for slightly reorganizing the con-
ceptual landscape by letting go of the “Myth of Cognitive Agency”
as the implicit, paradigmatic model of what conscious cognitive
processing really is. In addition, it is now empirically plausible
to hypothesize that the neural correlate of non-autonomous con-
scious thought overlaps to a considerable degree with ongoing
activity in the DMN, therefore the postulation of a local, domain-
specific identity is a tenable, coherent metaphysical interpretation
of this fact. Whatever will figure as the explanans in a future
scientific theory of mind wandering will therefore not be global
properties of “the mind” or the person as a whole, but specific
11For details, see Metzinger, 2003a, 2006, section 4. The philosophical notion
of a “phenomenal model of the intentionality relation” (PMIR) is directly
related to the idea of dynamically integrating top-down control (e.g., by the
fronto-parietal control network) with subpersonal, bottom-up components
(e.g., a subset of activity in the default-mode network) by creating an internal
model of the whole organism as currently being directed at an object com-
ponent, for example, a well-ordered train of thought; see Smallwood et al.
(2012). The PMIR would then be the conscious correlate of this process, the
phenomenal experience of what was termed CA in the main text.
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microfunctional properties realized by the local neural dynamics
underlying each episode of consciously experienced subpersonal
cognitive processing. It remains true that a considerable part of
conscious thought (very roughly, one third) is experienced as CA
from the first-person perspective and consequently ascribed as
a personal-level property. Therefore, a second major target for
future research is to investigate the transitions connecting single
episodes of mind wandering with episodes of M-autonomy or
immediately following further episodes, and those events that we
currently describe as the regaining of meta-awareness (Schooler
et al., 2011).
MAKING PROGRESS ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
MIND-WANDERING
A useful conceptual instrument to develop more fine-grained
descriptions of the phenomenology of mind-wandering is the
notion of a PSM; (Metzinger, 2003a, 2006, 2007). A PSM is a
conscious representation of the system as a whole, including not
only global body representation (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009;
Metzinger, 2014), but also psychological, social and other poten-
tial personal-level properties. One central idea of the self-model
theory (Metzinger, 2003a) is that, under standard conditions, a
large part of the human PSM is “transparent,” because we are not
able to experience it as a model and therefore fully identify with it
representational content.
In order to describe the phenomenology of mind wandering
more precisely, it is a good strategy to have a closer look at the
onset of an episode as well as at the way in which periods of mind-
wandering end, when we suddenly “come to ourselves” again.
What is needed are individuation criteria telling us what exactly
one episode is, and how its temporal boundaries can be deter-
mined. In the following three sections I will sketch three ways
in which one might gain fresh perspectives on mind wandering
by focusing on the onset and the termination of mind wandering
episodes plus what I take to be the perhaps most interesting, but
hitherto neglected phenomenological characteristic of the two
transition phases marking the onset and the end of each episode:
The sudden shift in the unit of identification (UI).
THE SELF-REPRESENTATIONAL BLINK
If we conceive of the process that “switches” between perceptu-
ally coupled states and states that are decoupled from the current
situation as a dedicated functional module, then this module
must employ a set of criteria, which are as yet unknown (Klinger,
2013, p. 14). However, the human brain can also be viewed as
a physical system that fluidly, rapidly, and continuously under-
goes metastable transitions between different dynamical states,
for example those characterizing the mind wandering state and
those characterizing M-autonomy and meta-awareness (Bressler
and Kelso, 2001). An important aspect of the phenomenology of
mind wandering is that no such criteria or dynamical constraints
are explicitly represented on the level of the PSM (Metzinger,
2003a, 2007): We do not know why an episode of mind wander-
ing has just begun, and the very first content element typically
comes as a surprise. We may sometimes possess what Schooler
et al. (2011) call “meta-awareness” for the second “carriage” in a
train of thought, as it were, but the appearance of the first content
element, subjectively, is an unpredicted event, thus, contributing
to the subjective sense of lost control and the sudden appear-
ance of unintentional mental behavior. We may think of this as
a systematic blindness of autobiographical self-representation, on
a very short time-scale: The dynamical shift itself, the actual event
of transition into the mind wandering state is not something we
can remember, it is not part of our conscious mental life.
Let me introduce a new technical term to refer to
this phenomenon, the “self-representational blink” (SRB).
Phenomenologically, the SRB is characterized by a brief loss of
self-awareness, followed by an involuntary shift in the unit of
identification (see next section). Functionally, we can describe it
as a failure of attentional and/or cognitive self-control, perhaps as
a depletion of resources. Alluding to the now well-studied phe-
nomenon of the attentional blink (Raymond et al., 1992; Shapiro
et al., 1997), the notion of a “self-representational blink” refers to
the fact that we are typically not able to consciously experience
the actual moment of transition from mindful, present-oriented
self-awareness to the identification with the “protagonist” of a
daydream, the content of the self-model in autobiographical plan-
ning, depressive rumination, etc. Here, the speculative hypothesis
developed from conceptual considerations is that if the mech-
anism of temporal self-location has to be briefly suspended and
two different PSMs follow in close temporal proximity, the first
one will be easy to identify, remember, and report, but perfor-
mance on the contents of the second target will be impaired.
Therefore, the empirical prediction is that subjects should be
blind to self-related stimuli during the SRB. “Self-related stim-
uli,” for example, are all stimuli that have to do with current
body-perception, like interoceptive, visceral sensations, nocicep-
tion, vestibular input, proprioception, thermal and gravitational
self-perception, etc. More generally, self-related information is all
information that can in principle be represented in a cognitive
system’s PSM. The SRBwould be the brief temporal window sepa-
rating the PSM of the last conscious moment in which the system
was still perceptually coupled to the current environment from
the rapidly following PSM that constitutes the subjective center
of a mind wandering episode, or the conscious self of the day-
dream. Within this window, there would be self-blindness on the
level of phenomenal representation.
We do not know what the neural mechanisms are that allow
human beings to mentally locate themselves in a temporal order,
to define the point in time at which the self-as-represented is cur-
rently situated, and we also do not know the mechanisms under-
lying virtual temporal self-location as in “mental time travel”
(Buckner and Carroll, 2007). However, ongoing research on iso-
lating the minimal conditions for phenomenal self-consciousness
increasingly converges on the notion that transparent spatiotem-
poral self-location is necessary and sufficient in order to create
a robust sense of self, with ongoing attentional and CA not
being necessary conditions (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Windt,
2010, 2014; Metzinger, 2013a). The onset of a mind-wandering
episode clearly is a shift from one PSM to the other, and while a
weak sense of spatial situatedness and embodiment are preserved,
self-identification at a specific moment in time is often broken
and discontinuous. Mind wandering is “involuntary mental time
travel” (Song et al., 2012). This discontinuity in temporal self-
modeling interestingly resembles the frequent transitions found
in the dream state (Windt andMetzinger, 2007), and it might also
www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 931 | 9
Metzinger The myth of cognitive agency
explain the phenomenology of the SRB. It seems to be a concep-
tually necessity that, in order to shift from real-time/real-world
self-modeling (as anchored in the here and now, and ultimately
defined by the spatiotemporal position of the physical body)
to the virtual self-representation of a daydream or of autobi-
ographical planning (Stawarczyk et al., 2013), the system has
to achieve a dynamical transition departing from the subper-
sonal process of temporal self-location that co-constitutes the
previous minimal self-model. In standard cases, there will be a
discontinuity, because the current temporal frame of reference is
substituted by a new one12. If this speculative hypothesis, which is
derived from conceptual considerations plus the description of a
specific phenomenological aspect alone, points in the right direc-
tion, it should be possible to investigate the functional transition
underlying the SRB experimentally (McVay and Kane, 2013).
MINDWANDERING AS A SWITCH IN THE UNIT OF IDENTIFICATION
Let us look at a second phenomenological feature of mind wan-
dering that could, if correctly described, yield a new theoretical
perspective. Perhaps the most interesting phenomenological fea-
ture of mind wandering is a sudden shift in the UI. The UI is the
phenomenal property with which we currently identify, exactly
the form of currently active conscious content that generates
the subjective experience of “I am this!” Please note how many
mind wandering episodes are phenomenologically disembodied
states, because perceptual decoupling (Schooler et al., 2011) often
also means decoupling from current body perception (Metzinger,
2009, 2014; but see Miles et al., 2010a,b). A typical phenom-
enal property serving as the “target” of the hypothetical and
as-yet unknown mechanism of self-identification (Blanke and
Metzinger, 2009) would be the integrated contents of our current
body image, another standard example is the subjective quality
of “agency” in the control of bodily actions. Often, both target
properties coincide and simultaneously function as the locus of
identification. This is why, in standard situations, we experience
ourselves as embodied agents. Prima facie one might think that
the phenomenal self simply is wherever there is an experience
of causal control, for example in bodily or mental agency. The
phenomenally experienced “sense of effort” in bodily and mental
action would then be the essence of self-consciousness. However,
data about asomatic OBEs and bodiless dreams show a more
differentiated picture: For example, human beings are able to
passively identify with a non-extended point in space only while
retaining a robust sense of self (De Ridder et al., 2007; Windt,
2010; Metzinger, 2013a). The interesting contribution research
on mind wandering now makes is that even during ordinary
wake states, there are frequent and uncontrolled shifts in the
12This is not to categorically exclude the possibility that the transition from
stimulus-constrained thought to mind wandering and daydreaming could be
gradual; perception itself is subtly modulated by expectation, prediction and
anticipation, see Clark (2013); Madary (2013), and relatedly, mind wandering
will not be an all-or-nothing affair, but will allow for various degrees and fluc-
tuations of control and external-stimulus correlation. It is a familiar fact that
mind wandering episodes are often triggered by perceptual stimuli. But the
opposite can also be true: One study found mental time travel to be associated
with subtle postural adjustments, with participants leaning backwards when
asked to imagine the past and leaning to the front when asked to imagine the
future cf. Miles et al. (2010a,b).
UI, and that these shifts are not deliberately initiated personal-
level events, but causally determined by unconscious, and as yet
not understood, processes on the subpersonal level of descrip-
tion. After each of these shifts, the sense of mental agency is
lost, and often the conscious sense of embodiment is considerably
weakened as well (Metzinger, 2014).
What remains when we lose M-autonomy and fall into a
mind wandering episode? It is a low-resolution situation model,
including an integrated representation of the body as located in
a spatial frame of reference, i.e., a model of the environment
plus an embedded bodily self. This default situation model keeps
the immediate, overall perceptual context available for selective
attention and simply does what it always does: it automatically
and continually minimizes prediction error by monitoring body
and immediate environment for potential unexpected events
(Friston, 2010; Mantini and Vanduffel, 2012, p. 84; Hohwy, 2013;
Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013; Seth, 2013). However, dur-
ing the mind wandering state, the system does not engage in
active sampling or precision optimization relative to its current
physical environment. This activity has now shifted from the real
to the virtual world. What is lacking is a stable subject-object-
structure in the sense of a knowing or acting self as directed
toward specific target objects in the proximal environment or
the current interoceptive body landscape, an EAM (see section
Mental Autonomy). The interesting point is that the process of
temporal self-location is now partly dissociated from the pro-
cess of spatial self-location: The UI shifts to the protagonist
of our current mind-wandering episode, say, the model of a
future self as employed in periods of autobiographical planning.
When not mind wandering, spatial self-location, temporal self-
location, and self-identification (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009)
coincide, during mind wandering episodes they become func-
tionally dissociated in an interesting way. Just like the functional
mechanism of temporal self-location, the subpersonal mecha-
nisms leading to the phenomenology of “I am this!” are clearly
open to experimental investigation (Lenggenhager et al., 2007;
Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Metzinger, 2013a; see Blanke, 2012
for review).
Given the new conceptual tool of a UI, two important fur-
ther phenomenological constraints for any future theory can be
described more clearly. First, there can be rapid, cyclically recur-
ring switches between two or more UIs. This can for example be
the case in the neurological condition of heautoscopy, where the
subject experiences seeing a second own-body in extracorporeal
space (Lukianowicz, 1958;Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1961; Brugger
et al., 1997; Brugger, 2002; Blanke and Mohr, 2005; Blanke, 2012,
p. 562), or during situations where we quickly alternate between
mind wandering and briefly returning to the real-world task at
hand, or to a cognitive task that demands CA and AA. In heau-
toscopy, self-location may frequently alternate between different
embodied and visually hallucinated extrapersonal positions and
may even be experienced at two positions simultaneously. In
mind wandering, we also frequently oscillate between two UIs, for
example the virtual conscious self of our daydream or depressive
rumination, and the perceptually coupled PSM that is needed for
selective, flexible, and context-sensitive motor control, to briefly
return to the current task in the real world. The second con-
straint is that there clearly is a variable strength in the degree of
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identification. In mind wandering, there is a phenomenological
“depth of immersion” that is in need of explanation and should
be amenable to further experimental investigation (Schad et al.,
2012), and perhaps it may be related to the cognitive system’s con-
stant task to find and intelligent trade-off between external and
internal resource distribution (Thomson et al., 2013).
THE RE-APPEARANCE OF META-AWARENESS
How exactly does an episode of mind wandering end? Schooler
and colleagues, referring to work by the late Daniel Wegner,
point out that regaining meta-awareness may be accompanied
by an illusion of control (Schooler et al., 2011, Box 1; Wegner,
2002). Whenever we have this case, it seems that a specific new
self-model has appeared: An autobiographical self-representation
depicting the last mental event as something that was self-
controlled, an instance of deliberate causal self-determination
on the mental level. This form of control is often described as
an autoepistemic form of self-control, as an instance of actively
acquired self-knowledge or a sudden insight. Thus, a typical
autophenomenological report may claim “I have just regained
meta-awareness, because I just introspectively realized that I was
lost in mind wandering!” Do we have reason to believe such
claims? Is the reappearance of meta-awareness a subpersonal
event or is it something in which global control and the conscious
EAM actually played a decisive causal role?
Because mindfulness and mind wandering are opposing con-
structs (Mrazek et al., 2012), the process of losing and regaining
meta-awareness can be most closely studied in different stages of
classical mindfulness meditation (Hölzel et al., 2011; Slagter et al.,
2011), In the early stages of object-oriented meditation, there will
typically be cyclically recurring losses of M-autonomy, plus an
equally recurring mental action, namely the decision to gently,
but firmly bring the focus of attention back to the formal object
of meditation, for example to interoceptive sensations associated
with the respiratory process. Here, the phenomenology will often
be one of mental agency, goal directedness, and a mild sense of
effort. In advanced stages of open monitoring meditation, how-
ever, the aperture of attention has gradually widened, typically
resulting in an effortless and choiceless awareness of the present
moment as a whole. Such forms of stable meta-awareness may
now be described as shifts to as state without a UI 13. Whereas
in beginning stages of object-oriented mindfulness practice, the
meditator identifies with an internal model of a mental agent
directed at a certain goal-state (“the meditative self”), meta-
awareness of the second kind is typically described as having an
effortless and non-agentive quality. Interestingly, the neural cor-
relates pertaining to this difference between “trying to meditate”
and meditation are now beginning to emerge (Garrison et al.,
2013).
Schooler and colleagues define meta-awareness as “one’s
explicit knowledge of the current contents of thought” (2011,
13A conceptual alternative is to describe them as states characterized by the
maximal unit of identification, i.e., states in which the subject of experience
identifies with the most general phenomenal property available, namely, the
global quality of awareness as such (see Box 1 and Metzinger, 2013b for dis-
cussion). One may speculate that there are distinct phenomenal state-classes
corresponding to each of the two logical possibilities.
p. 321). First, this raises the question what exactly an “explicit”
representation is, as opposed to an “implicit” representation.
Our intuitions about what makes a representation explicit are
inconsistent (Kirsh, 2006, p. 345; Palmer, 1978). “Explicit” could
mean topological equivalence between representational content
and representandum (e.g., in a perceptual object representa-
tion, parts of the perceived object could be directly mapped
onto parts of its corresponding neural representation), it is often
vaguely equivocated with “conscious,” or it could imply locality,
syntactic compositionality, semantic transparency (Clark, 1989),
or perhaps just mean “symbolic,” in the sense of “conceptual,”
or “propositional.” If I simply attend to the process of mind-
wandering, without forming a mental concept or engaging in
any form of mental judgment, memory, or categorization (Hölzel
et al., 2011)—would this be an explicit or an implicit form of
mental meta-representation? Would it be meta-awareness? In this
situation, I would possess M-autonomy and would therefore be
able to terminate the first-order process of mind-wandering at
will; I would satisfy the AA-constraint (I would be an attentional
agent), but I would only satisfy the CA-constraint in a weaker
sense (because I would not be engaging in high-level, symbolic
thought, although I would possess the corresponding ability and
know about this fact).
A second aspect of Schooler et al.’s proposed definition that
calls for future differentiation in the important notion of an
individual “noticing” the current contents of their mind (Chin
and Schooler, 2009; Schooler et al., 2011, Box 1) is the con-
flation of knowledge and phenomenal experience. Postulating
“explicit knowledge of the current contents of thought” (Schooler
et al., 2011, p. 321; emphasis TM) excludes the possibility of
higher-order misrepresentation, of being wrong about the cur-
rent contents of one’s own mind: In regaining meta-awareness,
we might sometimes misrepresent the contents of our own mind
(without being able to notice the meta-cognitive deficit itself),
or we might even hallucinate first-order mental content that was
never there in the first place. What we subjectively experience as a
form of knowledge does not have to be knowledge. Conceptually
“meta-awareness” (a phenomenological notion) is not a “sub-
type” (Chin and Schooler, 2009, p. 33) of meta-cognition (an
epistemic notion). If meta-awareness is supposed to be explicit
in the sense of quasi-symbolic mental representation, then an
independent epistemic justification would be needed to call it
knowledge. In short, defining the end of a mind-wandering
episode as a form of introspective knowledge buys one into a host
of epistemological problems that have plagued philosophers for a
long time. It may therefore be better to confine empirical research
programs to the phenomenology of mind wandering.
The concept of “mind wandering” was originally intro-
duced into debate as a phenomenological notion (Smallwood and
Schooler, 2006), i.e., it has been treated as a process that is
available for introspective attention and verbal report, a specific
kind of subjective experience (Seli et al., 2013). Therefore, con-
cepts like “stimulus-unrelated thought” (SIT; e.g., Smallwood and
Schooler, 2006) or “stimulus-independent and task-unrelated
thought” (SITUT; Stawarczyk et al., 2012) are only phenomenolog-
ical terms as well: We may subjectively experience the first event
in a conscious train of thought as unpredictable, uncaused, and
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Box 1 | Glossary of Terms.
M-AUTONOMY (MENTAL AUTONOMY)
The term “M-autonomy” (for “mental autonomy” as opposed to
autonomy in bodily or social action) refers to the specific ability to
control one’s own mental functions, like attention, episodic mem-
ory, planning, concept formation, rational deliberation, or decision
making. This ability can be a form of rational self-control, which
is based on reasons, beliefs, and conceptual thought, but it does
not have to be. The central defining characteristic is the “veto
component”: Being mentally autonomous means that all currently
ongoing conscious mental processes can in principle be suspended
or terminated. This does not mean that they actually are termi-
nated, it just means that the ability exists, and that the person
has knowledge of this fact. Functionally, a frequently recurring loss
of M-autonomy is one major characteristic of our cognitive phe-
nomenology. Phenomenologically, this feature often goes unnoticed.
V-AUTONOMY (VETO AUTONOMY)
The term “V-autonomy” (for “veto autonomy”) refers to the ability to
voluntarily suspend or inhibit an action. From a logical point of view
it is a functional property ascribed not to the brain, but to the person
as a whole. This capacity, which could also be called “intentional
inhibition,” also applies to mental actions. During a mind wandering
episode, we do not have this capacity, because we cannot actively
suspend or inhibit our ownmental behavior and have no explicit, con-
scious knowledge of this capacity itself. Conceptually, many forms
of mental self-control—like AA—presuppose V-autonomy. Because
they are not directly guided by consciously represented reasons,
explicit logical inferences, or arguments, however, they are not
rational forms of self-control.
AA (ATTENTIONAL AGENCY)
Paradigmatic autophenomenological report: <I am a self in the act
of controlling my attentional focus.>
AA typically involves self-identification with an extended body
image, plus attentional self-control. It requires a conscious represen-
tation of oneself as an entity currently controlling mental resource
allocation; and/or having the potential for controlling subsymbolic
mental resource allocation.
CA (COGNITIVE AGENCY)
Paradigmatic autophenomenological report: <I am a thinking
self.>
CA typically involves self-identification with an extended body
image, plus high-level cognitive self-control. It requires a conscious
representation of oneself as an entity currently controlling high-
level cognitive processing, including quasi-symbolic, conceptual,
and propositional contents; and/or having the potential for con-
trolling high-level cognitive processing, including quasi-symbolic,
conceptual, and propositional content.
PSM (PHENOMENAL SELF-MODEL)
Paradigmatic autophenomenological report: <I am a self>
A conscious, global and multimodal representation of the cogni-
tive system as a whole, which may also include psychological and
social properties (see Metzinger, 2003a, 2006, 2007 for details).
EAM (EPISTEMIC AGENT MODEL)
Paradigmatic autophenomenological report:<I am a knowing self>
An EAM is a special type of PSM, allowing a cognitive system
to develop a genuine first-person perspective. The EAM refers to a
conscious self-representation of the system as an individual entity
capable of epistemic self-control, i.e., as currently standing in and/or
actively constructing knowledge relations to certain parts of the
world; and/or as having the ability to actively establish such relations.
AA is sufficient for having an EAM, CA is not a necessary condition.
The beginning of a mind wandering episode is characterized by a
collapse of the EAM.
SRB (SELF-REPRESENTATIONAL BLINK)
Phenomenologically, the SRB is characterized by a brief loss of self-
awareness, followed by an involuntary shift in the UI (see below).
Functionally, we can describe it as a failure of attentional and/or cog-
nitive self-control. Alluding to the well-studied phenomenon of the
attentional blink (Raymond et al., 1992; Shapiro et al., 1997), the
notion of a “self-representational blink” refers to the fact that we
are typically not able to consciously experience the actual moment
of transition from mindful, present-oriented self-awareness to the
identification with the “protagonist” of a daydream, the content of
the self-model in autobiographical planning, etc. An empirical pre-
diction of the current account is that subjects should be blind to
self-related stimuli during the SRB.
PERSONAL- AND SUBPERSONAL-LEVEL EXPLANATIONS
Personal-level explanations are typically horizontal, they attribute
properties to the person as a whole and proceed from the past to the
future in explaining single events by representing a diachronic causal
relation as a horizontal line. Subpersonal explanations are typically
vertical: they concern the relationship between micro- and macro-
levels, for example by explaining the abilities or dispositions an
organism has in terms of its parts and their causal relations, or by giv-
ing a functional analysis that becomes more and more fine-grained.
Mind wandering arguably can be explained on the subpersonal level.
The question then becomes which forms of conscious cognition, if
any, must necessarily be described as personal-level phenomena,
which of them are subpersonal processes, and how the relation
between personal and subpersonal phenomena can be understood
(the “interface problem”).
DREAM/LUCIDITY
Dreams are complex hallucinatory experience occurring in sleep or
during sleep-wake transitions, in which the experiential subject is
fully immersed and localized in a spatiotemporal scene. Dreams
are characterized by severe, and frequently unnoticed deficits in
memory, cognition, and rationality. AA and CA are mostly absent,
the EAM is highly unstable (Windt, 2010, 2014; Metzinger, 2013b).
“Lucidity” refers to the rare phenomenon that a dreamer is aware
of the fact that he or she is currently dreaming. Lucidity can be
conceptually analyzed as the gradual stabilization of an EAM and
the regaining of M-autonomy. There are different types and stages
of lucidity (Windt and Metzinger, 2007; Noreika et al., 2010), and
there has been recent progress in isolating the neural correlates
of such transitions (Voss et al., 2009, 2013; Dresler et al., 2012).
The “meta-awareness” that is regained in dream lucidity may be
interestingly related to the termination of mind-wandering episodes
during waking periods (Schooler et al., 2011).
UI (PHENOMENAL UNIT OF IDENTIFICATION)
In most dream and waking states there is a UI, determining the
conscious experience of “I am this!” In mind wandering and in
dreams, the UI can be highly variable, a fact that potentially lends
itself to a new way of categorizing individual episodes and thereby
constructing a novel taxonomy. (Continued)
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Box 1 | Continued
MINIMAL UI
The minimal UI is the simplest phenomenal property available for
subjective identification. It is not clear what the minimal UI for mind
wandering is or how the mechanism of spatiotemporal self-location,
a candidate for the minimal UI, works (Windt, 2010; Blanke and
Metzinger, 2009).
MAXIMAL UI
The maximal UI is the most general phenomenal property
available for subjective identification. Arguably, this is the
experiential quality of the unity consciousness per se (i.e.,
phenomenality as such). In some advanced states of med-
itative practice, during certain kinds of lucid dreams and
out-of-body experience the experiential subject seems to be
identified with the maximal UI (see Metzinger, 2013b for
details).
not goal-directed. And indeed, research on mind wandering has
already yielded a whole range of interesting results concerning the
phenomenology of thought, which, for example, are highly rel-
evant for the predominantly philosophical debate on “cognitive
phenomenology” and could be interestingly related to the cur-
rent philosophical discussion on this topic (Bayne andMontague,
2011). However, this contingent fact does not exclude the log-
ical possibility of unconscious mind wandering: What we can
consciously access as daydreaming, inner thoughts, fantasies, and
feelings may rather be just the tip of the iceberg, a small partition
of a much larger state space in which the continuous cognitive
dynamics unfolds. Conscious mind wandering would then be
characterized by a higher degree of coherence, but still emerge out
of a larger unconscious background of activity (Horovitz et al.,
2009; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010; Samann et al., 2011).
However, as mind-wandering plausibly is identical with a pro-
cess in the brain, and as one fundamental principle of science is
the assumption of the “Causal Closure of the Physical” (stating
that every event that has a cause has a physical event as its suffi-
cient cause, cf. Kim, 1993, 2005; Stoljar, 2009), the “spontaneity”
of the onset of mind wandering is only a phenomenological prop-
erty as well (and one that can perhaps be scientifically explained
via the SRB, see section The self-representational blink). There
will not only be unconscious neural precursors of mind wan-
dering itself, but also specific, introspectively inaccessible goal
representations that drive the high-level phenomenology of mind
wandering (Klinger, 2013), for example, of postponed goal-states
which have been environmentally cued by goal-related stimuli
under high cognitive load (Cohen, 2013; McVay and Kane, 2013),
as well as unconscious causal antecedents for 2nd-order acts
of intentionally inhibiting the flow of activity (Filevich et al.,
2013). There is no free won’t. From a functional perspective, M-
autonomy dramatically expands our inner and outer space of
possible behaviors, it is an entirely new level of naturally evolved
intelligence. But this fact does not imply a libertarian concept of
free will assuming uncaused, but causally effective mental events.
The PSM can be involved in the process of self-control by enabling
veto-style inhibition and a phenomenology of top-down control,
but it does not have to be. Successful inhibition can be an entirely
subpersonal process. For example, it has been demonstrated that
inhibitory control processes can be modulated in a completely
unconscious and unintentional manner (Hepler and Albarracin,
2013) and that unconscious no-go stimuli are sufficient to activate
prefrontal control networks in the inferior frontal cortex and the
pre-supplementary motor area (van Gaal et al., 2010). This also
means that “task-unrelatedness” is a phenomenological notion
only: It subjectively appears to us as if such episodes were not goal-
directed, but given an unconscious functional context, they may
well be adaptive and contribute to task solution (Klinger, 2013;
Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013). In addition, a well-known fact
from perceptual psychology is that the discriminatory resolution
power of attention outstrips category formation (for a philo-
sophical discussion, see Raffman, 1995). Consequently, there may
be much more to the phenomenology of mind wandering than
is verbally reportable—simply because introspective attention is
much more subtle and nuanced than the type of conceptually
mediated cognitive access leading to verbal report.
In an important theoretical paper Jonathan Smallwood (2013;
for critical discussion see Franklin et al., 2013) has introduced
the distinction between those functional processes that govern
the occurrence of a conscious thought and those that con-
trol the way in which it later begins to unfold over time. This
view can be interestingly integrated with the self-model theory
of subjectivity (Metzinger, 2003a,b, 2006, 2007, 2008), which
assumes the existence of an unconscious as well as a conscious
self-model. The conscious self-model (or PSM) is that parti-
tion of a more comprehensive global self-representation that is
functionally available for introspective attention, top-down cog-
nitive control, and the generation of flexible, context-sensitive
behavior. Given this framework, there can be unconscious goal-
representations (as dynamic parts of the unconscious self-model)
that trigger extended unconscious cognitive processes, which at
some point become integrated into the PSM. As only the con-
tent of the conscious self-model is available for attention and
verbal report, the resulting subjective phenomenology would
often be one of spontaneity and lack of goal-directedness. Sincere
first-person reports, necessarily, would then often describe such
processes as “task-unrelated.” From a third-person perspective,
however, it is obvious that a complex human organism con-
stantly has to solve many problems at the same time, in different
time windows, with multiple goal-states to be achieved, some of
them conflicting and/or lying in the distant future, and that most
of these subpersonal, long-term problem-solving processes will
take place in the unconscious self-model. Whenever such paral-
lel processes spill over from the unconscious into the conscious
self-model, new forms of control like intentional inhibition or
attentional modulation become available. However, the person
herself might not consciously recognize the relevance of the cor-
responding conscious thought content at all, simply because its
relation to her own long-term goals plus a preceding, and pos-
sibly extended, processing history are only represented in the
unconscious self-model.
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Franklin et al. (2013, p. 540) identify determining the “when”
of mind wandering as “the major obstacle to further significant
advances in mind wandering research” while pointing out poten-
tial confounds between the frequency of mind wandering and
the duration of single episodes. Here, it is important to note that
the individuation of mental events is itself a difficult conceptual
issue. At the very least, one must distinguish between the phe-
nomenological individuation of mental events via subject’s reports
(i.e., by first-person introspection of PSM-content) and the func-
tional individuation of events (i.e., by their independently observ-
able causal role). Smallwood’s process-occurrence framework
may therefore help to isolate different functional components of
thought, and one can perhaps describe the self-representational
blink and the reportable onset of a mind-wandering episode as
exactly those moments where some aspects of themassively paral-
lel activity in the unconscious self-model spills over into the PSM.
The “occurrence” would then be the (phenomenal) moment at
which this activity can be introspectively detected for the first
time, whereas the “process” is a (functional) chain of events that
crosses the boundary between the unconscious and the conscious
self-model, perhaps even multiple times and in both directions.
Let me close by pointing to a structural commonality with
well-known problems in dream research, which may shed further
light on the issue what exactly it means that a mind-wandering
episode ends. First, there is the phenomenon of “false awakening,”
that is of realistic dreams of waking up (Green, 1994; Windt
and Metzinger, 2007; Windt, 2014); second, current research
shows that there are different levels or stages of becoming lucid
in a dream (Noreika et al., 2010; Metzinger, 2013a; Voss et al.,
2013). If there is an additional awareness of meta-awareness as
just having been regained (i.e., a third-order meta-representation
or second-order EAM), then the point made in the previous
paragraph also applies: As such, this is just phenomenal expe-
rience, and not necessarily knowledge—we might always be
introspectively self-deceived. However, this purely conceptual
point is interestingly related to the empirical problem of defining
the end of specific episodes in research on mind-wandering: If
“noticing” involves an explicit meta-cognitive self-representation
in terms of categorizing one’s own current thought contents,
of applying a concept or making a mental judgment (“Oops, I
have just been daydreaming again!”), this may often lead to yet
another train of thought about having regained meta-awareness,
M-autonomy, and so forth. If veto control, CA, and AA are lost
in this process, then we may speak of a second mind wandering
episode having just begun. There is now a new phenomenal UI
(the phenomenal subject of meta-awareness or “meta-cognitive
self”), but the functional properties characterizing M-autonomy
are not realized by the brain.
How does one conceptually individuate mind wandering
episodes, how does one turn them into countable entities? This
is a methodological problem every good theory about mind wan-
dering will have to solve: If mind wandering episodes are to be
well-defined research targets and proper theoretical entities, one
must able to exactly specify the identity criteria that make one
such episode one and the same episode. If the existence of a SRB
at the beginning (see section The Self-Representational Blink) is a
necessary condition, and if we take the shift to a new UI (section
Mind Wandering as a Switch in the Unit of Identification) as a
second criterion for individuating episodes on mind wandering,
then we arrive at an interesting result. There are at least two ways
in which a mind wandering episode can end, one including the
SRB plus a shift to a new UI, and one without a shift to a new UI.
CONCLUSIONS
Research on mind wandering holds great promise for having sub-
stantial, long-lasting impact in many fields of philosophy at the
same time, not only in philosophy of mind, cognitive science,
and psychology, but also in epistemology, applied ethics, politi-
cal philosophy, or philosophy of law. At the same time, empirical
research can profit from conceptual clarifications, constructive
methodological criticism, and the metatheoretical perspective
offered by philosophers. I will therefore conclude by offering
a non-exhaustive list of conclusions and desiderata for future
research involving both disciplines.
• For about two thirds of their conscious lifetime, human beings
do not possess “M-autonomy”: Rational mental self-control,
the ability to terminate ongoing subpersonal mentation at will,
or to actively establish individual goal-commitments and to
impose rules onto one’s own mental behavior, are compara-
tively rare phenomena. As the large majority of our mental
activity is not driven by explicit, consciously available goal-
representations and cannot, while it is unfolding, be inhibited,
suspended or terminated, we are not mentally autonomous
subjects for about two thirds of our conscious lifetime.
◦ The working concept of “M-autonomy” is a heuristic tool,
which must be empirically grounded, semantically enriched,
and continuously differentiated.
◦ The functional potential for M-autonomy can be opera-
tionally defined. Is it a good candidate for a novel criterion
for personhood?
• On the level of conscious mental activity, epistemic agency
is an exception, not the rule. For human beings, epistemic
agency can be differentiated into (CA; the ability to control
goal-directed/task-related, deliberate thought) and (AA; the
ability to control the focus of attention). For most of their
conscious lifetime, human beings are neither cognitive nor
attentional agents, and they also lack an explicit phenomenal
self-representation of themselves as currently possessing these
abilities. Conceptually, most of our conscious activity must
therefore be characterized as a form of unintentional mental
behavior.
◦ Quantitative studies investigating the distribution of CA and
AA over the whole sleep-dream-wake cycle more precisely
are an important desideratum for future research.
◦ Philosophical action theory can now be interestingly
expanded to mental actions, integrating a large number
of novel bottom-up constraints delivered by psychological
research on mind wandering.
• Empirically, it is now plausible to assume a large overlap
between the minimally sufficient neural correlate of episodes
of mind wandering and activity in the DMN. Therefore, mind
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wandering is a target for vertical, subpersonal psychological
explanation. Those neurofunctional properties that constitute
an episode of mind wandering and determine its phenomenal
content, and which will prominently figure in a future scien-
tific explanation, will not be global properties of “the mind,”
or properties that have to be ascribed on the personal level of
description.
◦ The vague, folk-psychological umbrella term of “mind wan-
dering” should be dissolved into a well-ordered set of suc-
cessor concepts.
◦ Mind wandering, daydreaming, depressive rumination,
perserverative cognition, or intrusive thoughts in insom-
nia likely are all different phenomena (Ottaviani and
Couyoumdjian, 2013). Therefore, the catalog of explananda
should continuously be differentiated.
◦ The minimally sufficient neural correlates corresponding
to each of the resulting theoretical constructs should be
isolated.
◦ What exactly is the constitutive relevance (Colombo, 2012)
of mind wandering for high-level cognition and the emer-
gence of a first-person perspective?
• Roughly two thirds of conscious thought must be described as
a subpersonal process that functionally results from a cyclically
recurring loss of M-autonomy. A parsimonious metaphysical
interpretation of available empirical data suggests a domain-
specific identity of non-autonomous conscious thought with a
large subset of DMN-activity. Conceptually, mind wandering
is not a property of the person as a whole, but a set of func-
tional properties realized by a specific part of the brain and its
temporal dynamics.
◦ What are these properties, what is their evolutionary history?
◦ The logical relationship between personal-level and subper-
sonal explanations should be more closely investigated for
the special case of conscious cognition.
• Internally, cognitive processing only becomes a personal-level
process by being functionally integrated into and actively con-
trolled with the help of a specific form of transparent conscious
self-representation, the EAM. An important conceptual dis-
tinction is the one between conscious self-representation of
ongoing cognitive or AA and the passive representation of the
ability to act as an epistemic agent, involving the phenomenol-
ogy of knowing about the potential for mental action without
actually realizing it.
◦ In describing rapid fluctuations and gradual transitions
between periods of meta-awareness and episodes of mind
wandering, it may be helpful to distinguish a weak and a
strong EAM.
◦ “Zoning out” or unaware mind wandering can be described
as a complete collapse of the EAM, whereas “tuning out”
would be the retaining of a conscious self-model involving
the ability for epistemic agency, a weak EAM.
◦ What exactly is the causal contribution the EAM makes?
Which of its aspects are purely phenomenal or of a confabu-
latory nature?
• The phenomenology of mind wandering must be described
in a more fine- grained manner. Individuation criteria for
individual episodes should be developed.
◦ What are the temporal boundaries of episodes of mind
wandering?
◦ Does every episode begin with a self-representational blink?
Can the hypothesized blindness to self-related stimuli be
empirically verified?
◦ Can individual episodes successfully be categorized accord-
ing to their UI? Can questionnaires be optimized in order to
reliably pick out the UI, turning it into a new dimension for
scientific taxonomies of subpersonal cognition?
◦ How can research on mind wandering help to describe
the EAM in its purest form, including its collapse and
re-emergence at the onset and end of each episode?
◦ Is what has been termed “meta-awareness” in the psycho-
logical literature necessarily a form of self-consciousness? Is
there evidence for non-egoic forms of meta-awareness?
• Meditation is a systematic, formal practice of cultivating
M-autonomy.
◦ How are attentional lapses, the SRB, and periods of
M-autonomy distributed across different stages and types of
meditation?
◦ In meditation, is there evidence for mind-wandering
episodes that do not begin with a SRB?
◦ In what way does the ending of a mind-wandering episodes
differ from the corresponding transition during ordinary
everyday life? Which forms of emerging meditative meta-
awareness can be conceptually described as a shift in the UI,
which ones do not involve a new unit of identification?
◦ In mindfulness meditation, what is the quantitative relation-
ship between mind wandering, meta-awareness (Schooler
et al., 2011), and mind blanking (Ward and Wegner, 2013)?
◦ Are there systematic illusions of control involved in medita-
tion practice, for example, when exiting an episode of mind
wandering?
◦ How does the event of regaining meta-awareness in med-
itation differ from corresponding transitions in ordinary
waking states and in the dream state?
• Interesting commonalities between the phenomena of mind
wandering and nocturnal dreaming are increasingly beginning
to emerge (Metzinger, 2013b).
◦ What exactly is the relationship between M-autonomy, the
occurrence of different stages of dream lucidity and what
researchers in mind wandering call “meta-awareness”?
◦ Can lucid lapses and mind-wandering lapses plausibly be
interpreted as the disintegration of the EAM?
◦ Are there common positive functionalities connecting
dreaming and mind wandering during wake states, such as
the encoding of long-term memory, complex, preparatory
motor planning, or creative incubation?
◦ False lucidity and the phenomenology of insight: In becom-
ing lucid and in daytime mind wandering, is the experience
of oneself having actively regained meta-awareness (and
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thereby M-autonomy) an illusion of control over a mental
event that was really triggered by an unconscious process?
◦ All these topics are of direct interest to the philosoph-
ical project of “cognitive phenomenology.” In particular,
the specific “phenomenology of insight” going along with
becoming lucid in a dream or with successfully catching
oneself mind-wandering in meditation may prove to be of
central importance. In the future, a stronger connection
between the philosophical debate on cognitive phenomenol-
ogy and empirical research on mind wandering, meditation
and lucid dreaming is desirable.
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